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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the properties of a new equity condition for infinite utility 
streams. The condition, which was introduced in our companion paper Asheim and 
Tungodden (2004b), is referred to as "Hammond Equity for the Future", and it captures 
the following ethical intuition: A sacrifice by the present generation leading to a uniform 
gain for all future generations  cannot lead to a less desirable utility stream if the present 
remains better off than the future. 
In the terminology of Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003), this new equity condition 
is a consequentialist condition, in the sense that it expresses preference for a more 
egalitarian distribution of utilities among generations. In contrast, the "Weak Anonymity" 
condition, which often has been invoked to insure equal treatment of generations (by 
requiring that any finite permutation of utilities should not change the social evaluation of 
the stream), is a purely procedural equity condition. As we discuss in Asheim and 
Tungodden (2004b), however, "Hammond Equity for the Future" is a very weak 
consequentialist condition. Under certain consistency requirements on the social 
preferences, it is not only weaker than the ordinary "Hammond Equity" condition, but it 
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is also implied by other consequentialist equity conditions like the "Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers" and the "Lorenz domination principle". 
From Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965), and later contributions (e.g., Svensson, 
1980; Shinotsuka, 1998; Basu and Mitra, 2003a; Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003; Sakai, 
2003; Xu, 2005) we know that it is problematic in the context of infinite utility streams to 
combine procedural equity conditions with conditions ensuring the efficiency of a socially 
preferred utility stream. In particular, Diamond (1965) shows that the "Weak Anonymity" 
condition cannot be combined with the "Strong Pareto" condition when the social 
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous in the sup norm topology (a result 
that he attributes to M.E. Yaari). This impossibility result has subsequently been 
strengthened by showing that the inconsistency remains even if "Strong Pareto" is 
weakened to "Weak Pareto" (Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003), if "Strong Pareto" is 
weakened to "Sensitivity for the present" (Sakai, 2003), and if numerical representability 
is substituted for the assumption that the social preferences are complete, transitive and 
continuous in the sup norm topology (Basu and Mitra, 2003a). 
Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) and Sakai (2004) show that the same kind of 
impossibility results can be established when consequentialist equity conditions are 
combined with "Strong Pareto". In particular, Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) establish 
that the "Lorenz Domination principle" is not compatible with "Strong Pareto" when 
social preferences are upper semi-continuous in the sup norm topology. 
The investigations by Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) and Sakai (2004) motivate 
doing a similar analysis for our "Hammond Equity for the future" condition. Since 
"Hammond Equity for the future" is a weak condition when compared to other 
consequentialist equity conditions, it is of interest to establish whether it to a greater 
extent can be combined with Paretian conditions. We show in this paper that, 
unfortunately, this is not the case: The "Hammond Equity for the future" is not 
compatible with "Strong Pareto" when social preferences are upper semi-continuous in 
the sup norm topology. As for the corresponding result by Suzumura and Shinotsuka 
(2003), no consistency requirements (like completeness and transitivity) on the social 
preferences are required for this result. However, if we impose that the social preferences 
are complete, transitive and continuous in the sup norm topology, and satisfy an 
"Independent future" condition, then "Hammond Equity for the future" cannot even be 
combined with the "Weak Pareto" condition. These are discouraging results, given the 
weakness of "Hammond Equity for the future" and its possible ethical appeal. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the setting, and state the 
conditions that we will return to in later sections. In Section 3 we show under what 
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circumstances "Hammond Equity for the future" is implied by other consequentialist 
equity conditions. In Section 4 we show that "Hammond Equity for the future" cannot be 
combined with "Strong Pareto" when preferences are upper semi-continuous in the sup 
norm topology, while in Section 5 we report on the inconsistency with "Weak Pareto" 
and "Sensitivity for the present" under additional conditions. Results relating to the 
"Pigou-Dalton" and "Lorenz domination" conditions are reported as corollaries. Finally, 
in Section 6 we discuss what these negative results entail for the usefulness of 
"Hammond Equity for the future" and other consequentialist equity conditions as ethical 
guidelines for intergenerational equity. 
2. Framework and conditions 
Let ℜ be the set of real numbers and ℵ the set of positive integers. The set of infinite 
utility streams is X = Yℵ, where Y = ℜ or Y = [0, 1]. Denote by ),,,,( 211 KK tuuu=u  an 
element of X, where ut is the utility of generation t, and denote by ),,,( 211 TT uuu K=u  
and ),,( 211 K+++ = TTT uuu  the T–head and T–tail of the utility streams respectively. Write 
),,(con Kwww =  for a stream with a constant level of utility equal to w ∈ Y. Throughout 
this paper we assume at least ordinally measurable level comparable utilities; i.e., what 
Blackorby et al. (1984) refer to as "level-plus comparability". 
For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, 1u ≥ 1v if and only if ut ≥ vt for all t ∈ ℵ; 1u > 1v if and only if 1u 
≥ 1v and 1u ≠ 1v; and 1u >> 1v if and only if ut > vt for all t ∈ ℵ. 
Social preferences are a binary relation R on X, where for any 1u, 1v ∈ X, 1u R 1v 
entails that 1u is deemed socially at least as good as 1v. Denote by I and P the symmetric 
and asymmetric parts of R; i.e., 1u I 1v is equivalent to 1u R 1v and 1v R 1u and entails that 
1u is deemed socially indifferent to 1v, while 1u P 1v is equivalent to 1u R 1v and ¬1v R 1u 
and entails that 1u is deemed socially preferable to 1v. We will consider different sets of 
conditions of R. 
First we consider two consistency conditions. 
Condition O (Order) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, 1u R 1v or 1v R 1u. For all 1u, 1v, 1w ∈ X, 1u R 1v 
and 1v R 1w imply 1u R 1w. 
Condition QT (Quasi-transitivity) For all 1u, 1v, 1w ∈ X, 1u P 1v and 1v P 1w imply 1u P 
1w. 
Condition O implies condition QT, while the converse does not hold. 
Consider next two continuity conditions (relative to the sup norm topology). 
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Condition C (Continuity) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 0||suplim =−∞→ tnttn uu  and, for all n, 
¬1v P 1un (resp. ¬1un P 1v), then ¬1v P 1u (resp. ¬1u P 1v). 
Condition USC (Upper semi-continuity) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 0||suplim =−∞→ tnttn uu  
and, for all n, ¬1v P 1un, then ¬1v P 1u. 
Condition C implies condition USC, while the converse does not hold. 
Consider next four efficiency conditions, where the condition SNP has been 
analyzed by Sakai (2003), while the condition SN is used by Asheim and Tungodden 
(2004b). 
Condition SP (Strong Pareto) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u > 1v, then 1u P 1v. 
Condition WP (Weak Pareto) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u ≥ 1v, then 1u R 1v, and if 1u >> 1v, 
then 1u P 1v. 
Condition SNP (Sensitivity for the present) For all 1w ∈ X, there exist 1u, 1v ∈ X, and T 
∈ ℵ such that (1uT, T+1w) P (1vT, T+1w). 
Condition SN (Sensitivity) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u >> 1v and there exists T ≥ 1 such that 
ut = w and vt = x for all t ≥ T, then 1u P 1v. 
Condition SP implies conditions WP (if R is reflexive) and SNP, while the converse does 
not hold. Moreover, each of conditions SP and WP implies condition SN, while the 
converse does not hold. 
We then turn to four consequentialist equity conditions. The two first require only, 
as we assume throughout this paper, at least ordinally measurable level comparable 
utilities. For complete social preferences these conditions coincide with those suggested 
by Hammond (1976) and Asheim and Tungodden (2004b), respectively. 
Condition HE (Hammond Equity) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u and 1v satisfy that there exists 
a pair r and s such that ur > vr > vs > us and vt = ut for t ≠ r, s, then ¬1u P 1v. 
Condition HEF (Hammond Equity for the future) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u and 1v satisfy 
that u1 > v1 > x > w and ut = w and vt = x for all t > 1, then ¬1u P 1v. 
The two next equity conditions require, in addition, that utilities are at least cardinally 
measurable and unit comparable. Such consequentialist equity conditions have been used 
in the context of infinite streams by, e.g., Birchenhall and Grout (1979), Asheim (1991), 
and Fleurbaey and Michel (2001), as well as Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) and Sakai 
(2004). The former of the two conditions below is in the exact form suggested by 
Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003). 
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Condition WLD (Weak Lorenz Domination) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u and 1v satisfy that 
there exist T > 1 such that 1vT Lorenz dominates 1uT and T+1u = T+1v, then ¬1u P 1v. 
Condition WPD (Weak Pigou-Dalton) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u and 1v satisfy that there 
exist a positive number ε and a pair r and s such that ur − ε  = vr ≥ vs = us + ε  and vt = ut 
for t ≠ r, s, then ¬1u P 1v. 
Condition WLD implies condition WPD, while the converse does not hold. The 
implications between condition HEF, on the one hand, and the three other equity 
conditions, on the other hand, will be treated in the next section. 
We end this section by stating the following two conditions. The first of these is 
implied by Koopmans' (1960) postulates 3b and 4, and means that a decision concerning 
only generations from the second period on can be made as if the present time (period 1) 
was actually at period 2; i.e., as if generations {1, 2, …} would have taken the place of 
generations {2, 3, …}. It is stated by this name, but in a slightly stronger form, by 
Fleurbaey and Michel (2003). 
Condition IF (Independent future) For all 1u, 1v ∈ X with u1 = v1, 1u R 1v if and only if 
2u R 2v. 
The second is applicable when Y = [0, 1] and coincides with Koopmans' (1960) postulate 
5. 
Condition ES (Extreme streams) For all 1u ∈ X, con1 R 1u R con0. 
Condition WP implies condition ES, while the converse is not true. 
3. Hammond Equity for the future 
For streams where well-being is constant from the second period on, condition HEF 
states the following: If the present is better off than the future and a sacrifice now leads to 
a uniform gain for all future generations, then such a transfer from the present to the 
future cannot lead to stream that is less desirable in social evaluation, as long as the 
present remains better off than the future. 
To appreciate the weakness of condition HEF, consider the following result. 
Proposition 1 Let Y = ℜ. If QT and SN hold, then each of HE and WLD implies HEF. 
If O and SN hold, then WPD implies HEF. 
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Proof. Assume u″ > u′ > w′ > w″. We must show under the given conditions that 
each of HE, WLD, and WPD implies ¬(u″, conw″) P (u′, conw′). 
Since u″ > u′ > w′ > w″, there exists an integer n and utilities v, x ∈ Y satisfying u″ 
> u′ > v ≥ w′ > x > w″ and u″ − v = n(x − w″). 
If HE holds, then ¬(u″, conw″) P (v, x, conw″), and by SN, (u′, conw′) P (v, x, conw″). 
By QT, ¬(u″, conw″) P (u′, conw′). 
Consider next WLD and WPD. Let 1u0 = (u″, conw″), and define, for i ∈ {1, … , n}, 
1ui inductively as follows: 
)(1 wxuu it
i
t ′′−−= −   for t = 1 
xuit =     for t = 1 + i 
1−= itit uu     for t ≠ 1, 1 + i. 
If WLD holds, then ¬ 1u0 P 1un, and by SN, (u′, conw′) P 1un. By QT, ¬(u″, conw″) P 
(u′, conw′) since 1u0 = (u″, conw″). 
If WPD holds, then by O, for i ∈ {1, … , n}, 1ui R 1ui−1, and by SN, (u′, conw′) P 
1un. By O, (u′, conw′) P (u″, conw″) since 1u0 = (u″, conw″). Hence, ¬(u″, conw″) P (u′, conw′).   
□ 
Note that condition HEF involves a comparison between a sacrifice by a single 
generation and a uniform gain for each member of an infinite set of generations that are 
worse off. Hence, contrary to the standard Hammond Equity condition, the weakly 
welfare increasing transfer from the better-off present to the worse-off future specified in 
condition HEF always increases the total amount of utility along a stream, if utilities are 
made (at least) cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This entails that condition 
HEF is implied by both the "Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers" and the "Lorenz 
domination principle", independently of what specific cardinal utility scale is imposed 
(provided that the consistency conditions specified in Proposition 1 are satisfied). Hence, 
"Hammond Equity for the future" can be endorsed both from an egalitarian and utilitarian 
point of view. In particular, condition HEF is much weaker and more compelling than 
the standard Hammond Equity condition. 
The binary relation R should, in the context of the present paper, be interpreted as 
the social preferences of generations {1, 2, … }. However, since the cardinality of 
infinite streams is the same independently of when they start, the binary relation R allows 
us to pose the following question: For any Xuu ∈= ),,( 211 Ku , and times r and s, does 1v 
R 1w or 1w R 1v hold, where, for all t ∈ ℵ, vt = ut+r−1 and wt = ut+s−1. I.e., for a given 1u ∈ 
X, if generations {1, 2, …} could have taken the place of generations {r, r+1, …} or {s, 
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s+1, …}, one can ask how generations {1, 2, …} would rank these alternatives in social 
evaluation. Hence, we can determine whether, along 1u ∈ X, the stream starting at time r 
is socially preferred (in the evaluation of generations {1, 2, …}) to the stream starting at 
time s (and vice versa), and we write ru R su (and su R ru) if it is. 
By invoking HEF in addition to O, C, SN, IF, and ES, and assuming that Y = [0, 
1], it turns out that, along any 1u ∈ X, the stream starting at an earlier time r will never be 
socially preferred to the stream starting at a later time s. 
Lemma 1 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O, C, SN, HEF, IF, and ES hold, then any 1u ∈ X, su R ru if s 
> r. 
Proof. This is contained in Asheim and Tungodden (2004b, Proposition 3).   □ 
In Asheim and Tungodden (2004b) we discuss and interpret this result. 
4. Strong Pareto 
It is straightforward to show that HEF is in direct conflict with SP under USC. Hence, 
there are no strongly Paretian and upper semi-continuous social preferences that satisfy 
our new equity condition. 
Proposition 2 Let Y = ℜ. There are no social preferences satisfying USC, SP, and HEF. 
Proof. Let u″ > u1 = u2 = ⋅⋅⋅ = un = ⋅⋅⋅ = u′ > w1 > w2 > ⋅⋅⋅ > wn > ⋅⋅⋅ > w′ = w″ and 
assume that wwnn ′=∞→lim . Then, for all n, ¬(u″, conw″) P (un, conwn) by HEF and (u″, 
conw″) P (u′, conw′) by SP. This contradicts USC since (un, conwn) converges to (u′, conw′) 
in the sup norm topology.   □ 
Note that no consistency conditions (like completeness and transitivity) on the 
social preferences are required for this result, which is a variant of Proposition 7 of 
Asheim and Tungodden (2004b). Our previous result uses a different continuity condition 
which is stronger than USC if preferences are complete. 
Compared to the result reported by Diamond (1965)—that conditions C and SP are 
inconsistent with "Weak Anonymity" (under the additional assumptions of completeness 
and transitivity)—we will claim that it is equally worrying that conditions C and SP are 
inconsistent with assigning priority to an infinite number of worst off generations in 
comparisons where the assignment of such priority only reduces the well-being of the 
better-off present generation, as expressed by condition HEF. In this respect, note that 
HEF neither implies nor is implied by "Weak Anonymity", and thus Proposition 2 is 
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different from impossibility results based on "Weak Anonymity" as a procedural equity 
condition. 
Since SP implies SN, we obtain the following corollary by combining Propositions 
1 and 2. 
Corollary 1 Let Y = ℜ. If QT holds, then there are no social preferences satisfying USC, 
SP, and HE; or USC, SP, and WLD. If O holds, then there are no social preferences 
satisfying USC, SP, and WPD. 
It should be remarked that the results of Corollary 1 can be strengthened; in 
particular, it follows from Theorem 3 of Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) that condition 
QT is not needed for showing that there are no social preferences satisfying USC, SP, 
and WLD. Moreover, both Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003, Theorem 1) and Sakai 
(2004, Theorem 2) show that only condition QT is needed for USC and SP to be 
incompatible with a strengthened version of WPD (namely, for all 1u, 1v ∈ X, if 1u and 1v 
satisfy that there exist a positive number ε and a pair r and s such that ur − ε  = vr ≥ vs = us 
+ ε  and vt = ut for t ≠ r, s, then 1v P 1u). 
5. Weaker Paretian conditions 
We now show that HEF is even in conflict with WP, provided that the social preferences 
satisfy conditions O, C, and IF. Hence, there are no weakly Paretian, complete, transitive 
and continuous social preferences that satisfy both "Independent future" and our new 
equity condition. 
Proposition 3 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O and IF hold, then there are no social preferences 
satisfying C, WP, and HEF. 
Proof. Assume that O, C, WP, HEF, and IF hold. Let 1u ∈ X be strictly 
decreasing; i.e., for all t ∈ ℵ, ut > ut+1. Then it follows directly from WP that 1u P 2u 
(where we recall from Section 3 that, by notational convention, the comparison relates to 
two paths starting at time 1, so that WP applies). Since WP implies SN and ES, this 
contradicts Lemma 1, which entails that 2u R 1u under O, C, SN, HEF, IF, and ES.   □ 
Since O implies QT and WP implies SN, we obtain the following corollary by 
combining Propositions 1 (which holds also if Y = [0, 1]) and 3. 
Corollary 2 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O and IF hold, then there are no social preferences 
satisfying C, WP, and HE; or C, WP, and WLD; or C, WP, and WPD. 
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Moreover, as the following proposition establishes, HEF is also in conflict with 
SNP and SN, provided that the social preferences satisfy conditions O, C, IF, and ES. 
Proposition 4 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O, IF, and ES hold, then there are no social preferences 
satisfying C, SNP, SN and HEF. 
Proof. Assume that O, C, SN, HEF, IF, and ES hold. Then it follows from O, ES 
and Lemma 1 that, for all 1u, 1v ∈ X, and, for all T ∈ ℵ, (1uT, con0) I (1vT, con0). This 
contradicts SNP.   □ 
Since O implies QT, we obtain the following corollary by combining Propositions 
1 and 4. 
Corollary 3 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O, IF, and ES hold, then there are no social preferences 
satisfying C, SNP, SN, and HE; or C, SNP, SN, and WLD; or C, SNP, SN, and WPD. 
We end this section by reproducing an observation contained in Asheim and 
Tungodden (2004b, Proposition 3), namely that HEF is not in conflict with SN even if 
the social preferences satisfy conditions O, C, IF, and ES. 
Proposition 5 Let Y = [0, 1]. If O, IF, and ES hold, then there exist social preferences 
satisfying C, SN, and HEF. 
Proof. Consider the social preferences having the following numerical 
representation 
.10      where,inflim)1(suplim)(1 ≤≤−+= ∞→∞→ λλλ tttt uuW u  
It can be verified that these social preferences satisfy O, C, SN, HEF, IF, and ES.   □ 
6. Concluding remarks 
Condition HEF assigns priority to an infinite number of worst off generations in 
comparisons where the assignment of such priority only reduces the well-being of the 
better-off present generation. We consider this to be a compelling consequentialist equity 
condition. In particular, as discussed in Section 3, the condition can be endorsed both 
from an egalitarian and utilitarian point of view. It is therefore discouraging that 
condition HEF to such a large extent limits the possibility of being Paretian (cf. 
Propositions 2, 3, and 4). In principle, there are two ways out of the ethical dilemma that 
these results pose. 
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One possibility is to drop continuity. In line with earlier literature, the analysis 
indicates that the continuity condition is not an innocent technical assumption; rather, the 
condition has significant normative implications in the social evaluation of infinite utility 
streams (e.g., in the words of Svensson, 1980, p. 1234, "the continuity requirement is a 
value judgment"). By employing social preferences over infinite utility streams defined 
by Basu and Mitra (2003b), Asheim and Tungodden (2004a), and Bossert et al. (2005) 
(and, if necessary, invoking Szpilrajn's, 1930, Lemma to complete the preferences), we 
can establish the existence of two kinds of social preferences that satisfy O, SP, HEF, 
and IF: One is classical utilitarian, the other is egalitarian and based on leximin. Such 
preferences are appealing, since they satisfy "Weak Anonymity" as well as the four 
consequentialist equity axioms listed in Section 2. On the other hand, they are all 
insensitive toward the information provided by either interpersonal level comparability or 
interpersonal unit comparability. Classical utilitarianism makes no use of interpersonal 
level comparability (even if utilities are level comparable), while leximin makes no use of 
interpersonal unit comparability (even if utilities are unit comparable). 
Another possibility is to weaken the Paretian requirement to condition SN. Then, as 
reported in Proposition 5, there are social preferences satisfying O, C, HEF, IF, and ES. 
However, the social preferences used in the constructive proof of Proposition 5 are 
unappealing, since they entail invariance for the well-being during any finite part of the 
stream. In particular, such social preferences do not satisfy Chichilnisky's (1996) "No 
dictatorship of the future" condition. However, there are more attractive alternatives. 
Conditions O, C, SN, HEF, IF, and ES imply insensitivity for the interests of the present 
only when the present utility exceeds the stationary equivalent of the utility stream. The 
conditions do not preclude a trade-off between the interests of the present and future 
otherwise. Therefore, there exist social preferences satisfying conditions O, C, SN, HEF, 
IF, and ES that are consistent with both of Chichilnisky's (1996) no-dictatorship 
conditions ("No dictatorship of the present" and "No dictatorship of the future"), and 
make use of both interpersonal level comparability and interpersonal unit comparability 
of (at least) cardinally measurable fully comparable utilities. These possibilities are 
discussed in greater detail in Asheim and Tungodden (2004b). 
Thus, it is our view that the impossibility results reported in the present paper 
should not be used to rule out "Hammond Equity for the future" and other 
consequentialist equity conditions as ethical guidelines for intergenerational equity. They 
do, however, show that consequentialist equity conditions seriously restrict the set of 
possible intergenerational social preferences. 
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